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This installment of Straight & Narrow takes a different form, as it is a counterpart to Alec 
Ostrow’s excellent 2008 article1 in the 
ABI Law Review concerning the extent 
of the duties of a chapter 11 debtor’s 
counsel (DIP counsel) to a chapter 11 
bankruptcy estate and its management.2
If a Lawyer Has the Estate  
for a Client, Does the Client 
Have a Fool for a Lawyer?
Bankruptcy is not 
like the rest of the 
legal world, in which 
the name of the client 
can give the lawyer a 
real understanding 
abou t  whom she 
represents. It’s too 
faci le  to  say that 
DIP counsel only 
represents the DIP 
and, therefore, she only owes a fiduciary 
duty to the DIP—because the DIP itself 
is a fiduciary for the bankruptcy estate. 
It’s also precious little guidance to say 
(although we have) that DIP counsel is 
estate counsel, unless we also spell out 
what that means.
 What does it mean to represent 
the estate? It is literally true that DIP 
counsel does not represent all of the 
various constituencies with an interest 
in the outcome of the case. For example, 
DIP counsel must have a separate role 
from that of counsel for the creditors’ 
committee, because those two entities 
can often have interests that conflict. 
Creditors’ committee counsel represents 
the unsecured creditors as a group and 
must take those interests into account 
when advising the creditors’ committee. 
The same principle holds true for other 
constituencies interested in distributions 
from the estate, and thankfully it is not 
true that DIP counsel owes a duty to 
individual creditors (or, for that matter, 
individual equity securityholders).3
 Although the constituents with a 
claim on estate assets—secured creditors, 
unsecured creditors and owners when 
there are sufficient assets left over—have 
representation already, it is not quite 
true to say that DIP counsel can take its 
marching orders from the DIP without 
consideration of the fiduciary needs 
of the estate itself. There is a theory 
missing here, and that is why there has 
been some real discomfort in trying to 
spell out exactly what DIP counsel’s 
responsibilities are. No normal theories 
really fit, which is why questions like 
whether DIP counsel has a duty to rat on 
a misbehaving DIP are so confounding.
Part of the reason 
that DIP counsel 
owes something to 
the estate is that the 
estate’s funds (read: 
money coming from 
the pockets of the 
unsecured creditors) 
are paying her fees 
and expenses. Do 
not get us wrong: 
There is an ethics rule in place that 
clearly states that the person who pays 
the bill, if that person is not the client, 
does not get to call the shots in the case.4 
Here, though, the estate is the raison 
d’etre of the reorganization: maximizing 
it, restructuring it and coming out 
successfully on the other side of chapter 
11. The DIP is charged with the rights, 
powers and duties of a trustee in chapter 
11 under 11 U.S.C. §1107. Of course, 
that statement just puts us back right 
where we started, in an infinite loop: The 
DIP itself is a fiduciary for the estate as 
a whole.
 In  a  sense ,  be ing  counse l  for 
the DIP is a lot like being counsel 
for a corporation: Counsel takes its 
marching orders from management 
(the bankruptcy analogy would be the 
DIP) but is beholden to the ultimate 
Straight & Narrow
1	 Ostrow,	“We	Don’t	Need	the	Case	Law	to	Turn	the	DIP’s	Attorney	into	a	
Court	Informant,”	27	ABI L. J. 14	(May	2008).





(Parts	I	and	II),”	25	ABI L. J.	46	(December/January	2007)	&	26	ABI L. J. 
36	(February	2007).
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owne r s  ( f o r  a  c o r po r a t i o n ,  t h e 
shareholders; for the DIP, the “owners” 
to whom the DIP owes allegiance 
is the estate—those “owning” the 
estate during the case and the owners 
eventually emerging on the other 
side of a successful reorganization).5 
I n  “ n o rm a l ”  ( n o n b a n k r u p t c y ) 
cases, the ethics rules recognize the 
tensions inherent in representing an 
entity, providing an understanding 
of the difference between direction 
(marching orders) and role (allegiance 
to  shareholders)  in  the  ru le  tha t 
provides for “up the chain” reporting 
when representing an organization as 
the client.6 Being counsel for the DIP 
is different from being counsel for 
the corporation though because DIP 
counsel’s behavior as an officer of the 
court is a significant component of the 
representation as well.
 In part because the chapter 11 
process is incredibly complex and 
because parties’ allegiances can shift 
constantly during the pendency of the 
chapter 11 case,7 DIP counsel is under 
a duty to keep the court updated as to 
its disinterestedness.8 Courts care about 
disclosure and about playing by the 
rules. Because the DIP itself generally 
is run by people who decidedly are not 
disinterested,9 it is the disinterested 
DIP counsel who must look beyond the 
wishes of the DIP’s management team 
to the overall needs of the estate and its 
ultimate residual owners.
 Sure, all lawyers are officers of 
the court in the larger sense of the 
concept. We are not supposed to lie to 
courts,10 let our clients lie to courts11 or 
engage in conduct “prejudicial to the 
administration of justice,” even when 
we’re not representing a client.12 Our 
conduct is proscribed in all sorts of 
ways to keep the system looking (and 
acting) fair.
 We think that there is more required 
of those lawyers who are being paid from 
estate funds. In all such cases it is the 
unsecured creditors who are ponying up 
the funds out of their own pockets for the 
greater good of moving the case forward. 
In exchange for this cost-shifting, estate 
counsel needs to be able to distinguish 
clearly between the direction they are 
getting from the people managing those 
constituencies who have an interest in 
the estate (e.g., the DIP, the creditors’ 
committee) and their role (to keep those 
constituencies focused on their own 
roles in chapter 11). With counsel for 
the creditors’ committee, any confusion 
between direction and role is easy to 
resolve: The creditors’ committee is 
supposed to look out for the interests 
of the unsecured creditors as a whole, 
much as the named plaintiffs in a class 
action must look out for all plaintiffs in 
that class action. Fall out of line with that 
role, and it’s time to substitute in new 
players who better understand their role.
 DIPs, however, often do not know 
who the ultimate owners will be. If 
the estate is hopelessly insolvent, then 
creditors will end up as the owners. If 
the estate holds out hope for equity 
securityholders though, the DIP has to 
balance the interests of the creditors and 
the equity securityholders, which is not 
an easy task. When we say that the DIP 
is a fiduciary for the estate, then we are 
saying that the DIP has this constant, 
guess-where-we-are-at-any-moment 
balancing act that it has to maintain. 
Therefore, DIP counsel has the role 
of looking over the DIP’s shoulder to 
make sure that the DIP takes its role as 
fiduciary for the estate seriously. The 
DIP, in essence, acts as a placeholder 
for the myriad interests that the estate 
comprises. As a mere placeholder, and 
as a non-disinterested one at that, the 
DIP can try to look out for the interests 
of the estate as a whole, but it is DIP 
counsel who must ensure that the DIP 
understands its role and acts accordingly. 
When the DIP either does not understand 
(or will not perform) its role, it is DIP 
counsel’s duty to rat on the DIP.
What Are DIP Counsel’s Duties?
 Although two cases have held that 
DIP counsel owes no fiduciary duty to the 
bankruptcy estate,13 the vast majority of 
courts have held, for a variety of reasons, 
that DIP counsel owes some form of 
fiduciary duty to the bankruptcy estate.14 
(Personally, we think that the courts’ 
frustration with how the DIPs in those 
cases behaved translated into a frustration 
that DIP counsel could not control their 
clients behavior.) Unfortunately, these 
cases have not clearly defined the nature 
and extent of those duties—probably 
because the idea of owing fiduciary duites 
to the estate conjures up the corollary 
idea of lawsuits by the “estate” against 
estate counsel. Even though courts have 
articulated several different aspects of 
DIP counsel’s fiduciary duty,15 the duty to 
rat and the related duty that every lawyer 
has as an officer of the court are the most 
frequently discussed fiduciary duties in 
bankruptcy cases. These duties overlap 
a bit, and we hope that a brief analysis 
of each of them will provide some 
guidance as to the scope of DIP counsel’s 
obligations in this area.
Duty to Rat
 In the nonbankruptcy world, lawyers 
agonize over whether they may rat 
on (i.e., inform) their clients to reveal 
wrongdoing because the duty to rat 
conflicts directly with the duty to keep 
client confidences.16 Fortunately, the duty 
to keep client confidences is by no means 
an absolute duty; nonetheless, when a 
lawyer concludes that she has to rat on 
her client, she still must agonize over how 
much information she is allowed to reveal. 
Inside the world of bankruptcy, though, it 
is because DIP counsel really represents 
the estate qua estate and not just the DIP 
itself that DIP counsel has a clear duty 
to rat on those running the DIP.17 Courts 
5	 This	concept	 is	what	 the	Supreme	Court	was	getting	at	 in	Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub:
	 In	 light	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 direct	 guidance	 from	 the	 Code,	we	
turn	 to	 consider	 the	 roles	 played	 by	 the	 various	 actors	 of	
a	 corporation	 in	 bankruptcy	 to	 determine	which	 is	most	
analogous	 to	 the	 role	 played	 by	 the	 management	 of	 a	
solvent	 corporation.	 Because	 the	 attorney-client	 privilege	
is	 controlled,	 outside	 of	 bankruptcy,	 by	 a	 corporation’s	
management,	the actor whose duties most closely resemble 
those of management	 should	 control	 the	 privilege	 in	
bankruptcy,	 unless	 such	 a	 result	 interferes	with	 policies	
underlying	the	bankruptcy	laws.
	 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub,	471	U.S.	343,	352	
(1985)	(citation	omitted;	emphasis	added).
6	 See	Model	 Rule	 of	 Professional	 Conduct	 1.13	 (organization	 as	 client),	
www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_13.html.
7	 One	of	us	writes	obsessively	about	 this.	See, e.g.,	Nancy	B.	Rapoport,	
“The	 Intractable	 Problem	 of	 Bankruptcy	 Ethics:	 Square	 Peg,	 Round	
Hole,”	30	Hofstra L. Rev. 977	(2002);	Nancy	B.	Rapoport,	“Our	House,	
Our	Rules:	The	Need	for	a	Uniform	Code	of	Bankruptcy	Ethics,”	6	Am. 
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 45	 (1998);	Nancy	B.	Rapoport,	 “Seeing	 the	Forest	
and	the	Trees:	The	Proper	Role	of	the	Bankruptcy	Attorney,”	70	Ind. L.J. 
783	(1995).
8	 See, e.g.,	 Fed.	 R.	 Bankr.	 P.	 2014;	 In re West Delta Oil Co.,	 432	 F.3d	
347,	355	&	n.23	(5th	Cir.	2005).
9	 See, e.g.,	 Ayer,	 Clevert,	 Pelofsky	 Rapoport	 &	 Whyte,	 Ethics:	 “Is	
Distinterestedness	Still	a	Viable	Concept?	A	Discussion,”	5	Am. Bankr. 
Inst. L. Rev. 201,	207	(1997).
10	Model	 Rule	 of	 Professional	 Conduct	 3.3,	www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
rule_3_3.html.
11	 Id.
12	Model	 Rule	 of	 Professional	 Conduct	 8.4,	www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
rule_8_4.html.
13	Hansen Jones & Leta PC v. Segal,	220	B.R.	434	 (D.	Utah	1998),	 rev’g 
In re Bonneville Pac. Corp.,	196	B.R.	868	 (Bankr.	D.	Utah	1996);	 In re 
Sidco Inc.,	 173	 B.R.	 194	 (E.D.	 Cal.	 1994).	Sidco	 has	 probably	 been	
overruled	by In re Perez,	30	F.3d	1209	(9th	Cir.	1994).
14	 See, e.g., Brown v. Gerdes,	321	U.S.	178	(1944)	(counsel	 in	bankruptcy	
cases	seeking	compensation	from	court	are	held	to	fiduciary	standards);	
ICM Notes Ltd. v. Andrews & Kurth LLP,	 278	B.R.	117,	126	 (S.D.	 Tex.	
2002),	aff’d, 324	F.3d	768	(5th	Cir.	2003);	In re Taxman Clothing Co.,	49	




and	objected	 to	 attempt	 to	dismiss	 case	where	new	management	was	
unperfected	secured	creditor	seeking	to	secure	its	position	to	detriment	of	
bankruptcy	estate).	See also DIP’s Attorney, supra	n.	3.
15	 Various	 other	 duties	 that	 courts	 have	 stated	may	 be	 part	 of	 DIP	
counsel’s	fiduciary	duties	include:	(1)	the	duty	to	investigate	the	debtor	
and	management;	(2)	the	duty	to	not	require	debtor	to	make	payments	
that	would	 endanger	 a	 debtor’s	 business	 operations;	 (3)	 the	 duty	 to	
review	 from	 bankruptcy	 estate’s	 standpoint	 those	 critical	motions	
filed	 in	 a	 debtor’s	 case;	 and	 (4)	 the	 duty	 to	 police	 the	 debtor	 and	 its	
management.	See also DIP’s Attorney, supra	n.	3.
16	See	Model	 Rules	 of	 Professional	 Conduct	 1.6,	www.abanet.org/cpr/
mrpc/rule_1_6.html.




would	 violate	 the	 DIP’s	 attorney-client	 privilege,	 DIP	 counsel	 should	
consider	making	 a	 “noisy	withdrawal.”	See generally	 Bowles,	 “Noisy	
Withdrawals:	Urban	Legend	or	Invaluable	Ethical	Tool?,”	20	Am. Bankr. 
Inst. J.	26	(Oct.	2001)	[hereinafter	Bowles,	“Noisy	Withdrawals”].
have uniformly held that in cases in which 
management has engaged in misconduct, 
DIP counsel has the duty to disclose this 
misconduct in some manner.
 The largest problem in this area is 
determining how serious the misconduct 
should be before the DIP counsel must 
disclose it. Although courts haven’t 
articulated an easy, concise test, several 
courts have noted that DIP counsel can’t 
“close their eyes” to matters having an 
adverse effect on the bankruptcy estate.18 
Nevertheless, courts have generally 
required the misconduct to be severe 
before requiring disclosure. Among the 
types of misconduct that courts have held 
must be disclosed are:
a. violation of court orders by 
insiders.  See, e.g. ,  In re Food 
Management Group, LLC., 380 B.R. 
677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
b. conflicts of interest with another 
court-approved professional. See, 
e.g., In re Sky Valley Inc., 135 B.R. 
925 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992).
c. refusal to pursue claims against 
insiders. See, e.g., In re DeVlieg Inc., 
174 B.R. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
d. failure to properly market or sell 
estate assets. See, e.g., In re Wilde 
Horse Enterprises Inc., 136 B.R. 
830, 838 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).
e. conversion, concealment or misuse 
of estate property. See, e.g., In re 
Ward, 894 F.2d 771, 776 (5th Cir. 
1990); In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135 
(Bankr. D. N.J. 1995); In re Barrie 
Reed Buick-GMC, 164 B.R. 378 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
 The basis of DIP counsel’s duty to 
disclose improper conduct arises from 
the significant court involvement in 
both the oversight of the bankruptcy 
estate and the attorney-appointment 
process. As noted by the Supreme 
Court’s observation in Brown v. Gerdes, 
attorneys whose retention and fees are 
subject to court approval are held to a 
fiduciary standard by that court.19 The 
extent of court involvement, akin in 
part to class action litigation, is different 
from other nonbankruptcy litigation, 
where there is little court oversight of 
the affairs of the litigants outside court. 
Therefore, the very nature of court 
oversight of the retention and payment 
of DIP counsel requires the imposition 
of the duty to rat on DIP counsel. Our 
advice? Start off by treating the problem 
like a MRPC 1.13 (organization as 
client) problem: Go higher and higher 
within the DIP to persuade management 
to do the right thing. If nothing works, 
then you may have to ask the court to 
replace management or seek to withdraw 
as counsel. That should signal a problem 
without running the risk of over-
disclosing confidences. If management 
opposes these actions, then you may 
have to disclose more information to 
the court or—worse yet—suggest the 
appointment of a trustee.20
Duty as an Officer of the Court
 Closely related to the duty to rat is 
an attorney’s duty as an officer of the 
court21 under the “candor to a tribunal” 
and other related ethics rules.22 In the 
leading case discussing the duties of 
DIP counsel as an officer of the court, 
the Fifth Circuit in In re Ward, 894 F.2d 
771 (5th Cir. 1990), held that an attorney 
would have to disclose the existence 
of any concealed assets and possible 
criminal activity by management that the 
attorney knew may have taken place.23 
Although this duty to disclose is similar 
to the duty to rat, all attorneys owe a duty 
to keep the legal system honest by virtue 
of their role as officers of the court; this 
duty does not arise from DIP counsel’s 
fiduciary duty to the bankruptcy estate. 
As with the duty to rat, however, and 
given the extent of court involvement 
with bankruptcy estates, it seems likely 
that courts will be far more sensitive to 
an attorney’s duty as an officer of the 
court in the bankruptcy context.24
Conclusion: The Law Is the Law
 To steal Dave Barry’s catchphrase, 
we are not making this up.25 We are not 
making up the fact that representing the 
DIP is a representation different from 
other types of representations, even 
other types of representations paid for 
out of estate funds. Creditors’ committee 
counsel know that they are always 
representing the unsecured creditors; 
only counsel for the hopelessly insolvent 
DIP can be completely sure that she has 
no duties to equity as well. We are not 
making up the fact that management of 
the DIP can sometimes lose sight of the 
fact that maximizing and reorganizing 
the estate, not self-preservation of 
management’s perks, is the point of 
chapter 11. We do not mean to create 
an automatic adversarial relationship 
between the DIP and DIP counsel; most 
of the time, we expect DIP management 
to do the right thing and not worry about 
the risk of DIP counsel’s duty to rat. We 
do mean to say that for those for whom 
chapter 11 operates not as a handbreak 
but as a piggybank, DIP counsel must act 
as an extra check on the integrity of the 
bankruptcy process. The estate, and all 
constituents who expect to draw from it, 
deserve no less.  n
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18	See In re Food Management Group LLC,	 380	 B.R.	 677,	 708	 (Bankr.	





even	 though	some	states	allow	disclosure	of	 imminent	financial	 fraud.	
The	 fact	 that	 your	 state	 bar	may	misunderstand	 your	 duty	 to	 rat	 puts	
you	in	a	precarious	position:	Fail	to	rat,	and	you	run	the	risk	of	angering	
the	 bankruptcy	 court;	 rat,	 and	 you	 run	 the	 risk	 of	 DIP	management	
bringing	you	before	your	state	bar	 for	a	breach	of	confidentiality.	Hey,	
we	never	said	that	bankruptcy	law	was	easy.
21	See Baker v. Humphrey,	101	U.S.	494	(1879); In re Arlan’s Dept. Stores 
Inc., 615	F.2d	925,	941	(2d	Cir.	1979).
22	 For	 a	 further	 discussion	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 Rules	 of	 Professional	
Conduct	related	to	an	attorney’s	obligation	of	candor	to	a	tribunal, see 
generally	Bowles,	“Noisy	Withdrawals,”	supra n.	148;	see also supra n.	
104-26	and	accompanying	text.
23	 894	F.2d	at	776.
24	See Food Management Group,	 380	 B.R.	 at	 709-715,	 where	 a	
bankruptcy	 court	 refused	 to	 dismiss	 a	 lawsuit	 for	 breach	 of	 fiduciary	
duty	and	fraud	on	the	court	against	DIP	counsel	seeking	damages	far	in	
excess	of	DIP	counsel’s	fees.
25	 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dave_Barry.
